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Law and Policy: Emphasis on
Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
By J. R. RICHARDSON *
1. INTRODUCrION
The law of evidence, which may be described in simple but
adequate language as the system of rules and standards by which
the admission and exclusion of proof in judicial trials is regulated,'
must, perforce, be examined in the light of what it is and what it
has been. Yet its future is equally important. The existing rules
become more meaningful and understandable, in the light of
legitimate objectives, when considered within the context of past
experiences and proposed modifications. It is reasonable to
assume that certain exclusionary rules of evidence emerged by
accident in the development of our adversary system of trials.2
But, substantially, they represent an established legalistic con-
sensus, reached through trial and error, on the desirability of
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, B.S., LL.B., LL.M., Yale.
'The proffer of proof and possible objection to its admission on trial is thefinal step in a careful and sometimes lengthy pre-trial process of planning and
production of testimony and real proof. See McCormick, Evidence, Chapter 1,
Planning and Presenting The Evidence (1954). The study of evidence is "a study
of calculated and supposedly helpful obstructionism."-Maguire, Evidence, Com-
mon Sense and Common Law, 11 (1947). Evidence is the method of satisfying
the court of the truth or untruth of controverted allegations of fact made by the
parties in their pleadings.-Tracy, Cases and Materials on the Law of Evidence,
1 (1938).
2 The common law system of evidentiary proof is rigidly exact in its insistence
on the most reliable sources of information. For example, we have the opinion
rule, hearsay rule and original document rule which seek for direct factual
evidence as opposed to secondary matter. It is altogether possible that in this
country our courts have tended to foreclose access to evidence of probative value
though insisting on rigid adherence to first-hand factual data for after all:
1. Expressions of sense perceptions are always conclusions.
2. Admission or exclusion largely should be within the trial court's
discretion in seeking the truth.
3. Rules of evidence should be treated as wise admonitions and not as
sacred tablets.
See United States v. Petrone, 185 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1950), in which Judge Frank
denounces the observance of canons which may become substantial obstacles to
developing the truth,
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seeking the truth through what is considered the best evidence
available to finders of fact.'
When we speak and read of "rules of evidence," one initially
is led to think of distinct compartments in which unalterable
precepts are stored until needed to supply invariable answers to
new and recurring problems.4 To the contrary, many parts of the
law of evidence fit flexibly into current trends in legal education
and judicial decisions on policy thinking and policy making. The
law of presumptions, burden of proof, best evidence rule, self-
incrimination, parol evidence rule, judicial notice and even hear-
say, to mention a few significant rules, involve policy considera-
tions of considerable magnitude. In a substantial part of the
subject, especially the exclusionary rules, the determination of
policy through a balancing of the various and conflicting interests
seeking recognition, affords the opportunity for the creation of a
rule admitting or excluding testimony on facts in issue. Evidence
is not often thought of in this light and yet, few fields of law
employ a more realistic consideration of social and policy factors.,
And, contrary to what might be expected, rules of evidence have
seldom, if ever, evolved from studies of probative force or value
of proof in solving disputed issues of fact." Rather, rules of
evidence are primarily designed to prevent certain types of evi-
dence from entering into judicial controversies. In any event,
rules of evidence as rules of procedure in regulating the course of
trials, or as substantive proof in controlling the issues and outcome
3 Direct evidence, which is generally favored by the courts, tends to prove or
disprove a fact in issue without resort to an inference or presumption, as in the
case of circumstantial evidence. However, the concurrence of well authenticated
circumstances may be more reliable and convincing than direct or positive
testimony, lacking in logical basis and unconfirmed by circumstances.-Haffler v.
McKinnery, 288 Ky. 782, 157 S.W.2d (1942). This is so because eyewitness
testimony is subject to (1) errors in observation, (2) defects of memory, (3) mis-
takes in relating observed facts, and (4) predispositional factors which subcon-
sciously affect sensory perception.
4Such a theory, logic ally untenable, is based on the formula, Law X Facts
= Decision. Actually, a decision in a given case cannot be an absolute because
both law and facts are variables due to the human factors involved.
5 Perhaps, somewhat anomalously, there is no field of law better adapted to
the development of logical thought and legal analysis, for perfection of skills in
discrimination and for mental exercise in exact thinking, than is evidence.6Dying declarations are admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule because
deemed reliable and hence to possess probative value. Yet, no one has ever made
a statistical survey to determine whether dying men do in fact tell the truth.
Business records are admitted under the "shop book" rule under the untested
assumption that merchants are honest and accurate in their bookkeeping. And
coerced confessions are excluded on the basis of unreliability when, in fact,
investigation might disclose that generally they are more reliable than voluntary
confessions due to the difficulty of extraction,
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of trials, must be treated and recognized as being deeply imbued
with considerations of policy.7 These rules purportedlly exemplify
calculated but benign obstructionism. The wisdom or unwisdom
of certain exclusionary rules presents an interesting problem for
skeptical scrutiny in the light of modem trends in methods of
establishing proof of facts to reach proper decisions.
What are desired objectives? How are they determined? And
are exclusionary rules of evidence proper media for their achieve-
ment? Generally speaking, the law in its regulatory process seeks
to resolve conflicts between men and men and between men and
the state by maling decisions which reflect the convictions of the
majority, or of at least a substantial segment of society being
governed.8 But conceding sincere motivation on the part of those
bearing the burden of making decisions, the end result may be
undersirable. This may be by reason of mistaken fact-finding or
improper objective. Errors in the fact-finding process can, and
do, lead to faulty verdicts in civil cases and conviction of the
innocent in criminal prosecutions.9 These errors are traceable to:
1. Rules of evidence which improperly admit or exclude.10
2. Misapplication of rules of evidence by the trial judge."
7 "I am especially interested in the field of procedure, because procedure
stands between the abuse of the principles of law and their use for the benefit of
mankind. You can have as high and as sound principles of law as possible, but if
you have not the procedure by which you can apply them to the ordinary affairs
of men, then it does not make any difference what the principles are or how
erroneous they may be."-C. J. Taft, address to American Bar Association, 1928.
8 "1 regret sincerely that I am unable to agree with the judgment in this case,
and that I think it my duty to express my dissent. This case is decided upon an
economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a
question whether I agree with that theory, I should desire to study it further and
long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty,
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do
with the right of the majority to embody their opinions in law."-Mr. Justice
Holmes, dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539 (1905), in
which the court held that a statute fixing minimum hours of labor per week
interfered with freedom of contract and the liberty of individuals protected by the
fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.9 Borchard, Convicting The Innocent (1932).-Contains the case history of
si'ty-five criminal prosecutions in which there were convictions with subsequent
proof of innocence. Some had been executed and were beyond the aid of
executive pardon.
10 Hearsay evidence is not rejected because it is unreliable but due to lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant according to most authorities. Rules
of privileged communications suppress valuable sources of facts where the interest
of society in protecting relationships is deemed paramount. But as to the indi-
vidual, why shouldn't the accused criminal be required to give his version of the
facts. The rule of privilege against self-incrimination is grounded in history rather
than reason.
11 In State v. Whitener, 191 N.C. 659, 132 S.E. 603 (1926), the trial judge
ruled that he could not "as a matter of law" hear the testimony of the defendant,(Continued on next page)
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3. Mistaken identification or interpretation by honest wit-
nesses.
12
4. Circumstantial evidence from which erroneous inferences
are drawn. 13
5. Perjury due to prejudicial self-interest.14
The above analysis highlights the difficulties which are in-
herent in striving to ascertain "social facts." That is, the establish-
ment of what actually happened between people to make them
party litigants.15 However, the facts of controversies cannot be
isolated for weighing in a vacuum. They are considered in the
light of principles of law which may be applied in a "balancing
of interests" process. This process sugests selection or choice on
the part of fact finding agencies. And the necessity of choice leads
to establishment of policy which should be grounded in a sensi-
tive awareness of the various interests which may be affected by
decisions. In recognition of this criterion, Professor Pound has
written that the aim of a sound legal system should be "to secure
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
in the absence of the jury, on the preliminary inquiry looking to the admissibility
of the alleged confession. His honor heard only the state's evidence as to how the
confession was procured and on this basis ruled it voluntary and admissible. In
Builders Steel Co. v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d 377 (C.A. 8th Cir.
1950), the court said, "The decision of the Tax Court is vacated upon the sole
ground that, in the trial of the case, the court erroneously excluded competent and
material evidence." In State v. Grieco, 184 Ore. 253, 195 P.2d 183 (1948), the
court admitted a bloody knife in evidence before the jury, "as tending to prove
the commission of the crime charged" over the objection of the defendant, who
admitted that he chased and killed his wife with a hunting knife and pleaded
insanity. The case in which trial judges play fast and loose with rules of evidence
could be multiplied ad infinitum.
12 Eyewitness testimony is often unreliable for the reasons set out in footnote
3, supra.
13 The advantages of circumstantial evidence are that, as the evidence com-
monly comes from several witnesses and different sources, a chain of circumstances
is less likely to be falsely prepared and arranged. This means that falsehood and
perjury are more likely to be detected and fail of their purpose. The disadvantages
are that a jury has not only to weigh the evidence of facts but to draw right
conclusions from them, in doing which they may be led by prejudice or partiality,
or by want of due deliberation and sobriety of judgment, to make hasty and false
deductions. This is a source of error not existing in the consideration of direct or
positive evidence.
14 Perjury produced by the accomplished liar is hard to detect. Cross
examination has been lauded by Wigmore as the most effective means of as-
certaining the truth. But it is often the case that the witness is as skillful as the
examiner. Modern means of investigation such as the lie detector and narco-
analysis have proven valuable at the investigation stage of criminal procedure.
15 The terminology "social facts" is used to denominate operative facts in
human relationships. They are in some degree distinguishable from "economic




as much as possible of the scheme of interests as a whole as may
be, with the least friction and waste; to secure as much of the
whole inventory of interests as may be, with the least impairment
of the inventory as a whole."' 6 Pound's advocacy of efficiency in
securing the whole inventory of interests sounds idealistic, but
the espoused theory is too broad and general in failing to define
the nature and structure of the entire field of human interests.
Recognition and attempted achievement of objectives or interests
must be preceded by a decision as to what interests will be
included in and excluded from a particular social pattern.17 This
is necessary in order to avoid confusion and conflict. Thereafter
problems of necessary compromise and required social controls
can be effectively considered."
Compromises and adjustments are inherent in the judicial
process if it is to be live, not static. Just as desired social change
and increased efficiency in business and industry are the results
of wise policy gleaned from new and at times radical ideas, so
must the law be flexible and shrewdly aware of current trends in
human affairs. As stated by Montesquieu, "Despots alone try to
govern everything with a general scheme and a rigid will ....
The contradictory elements frequently found in problems . . .
throw us into a regime of concession or compromise... Thus we
reach that middle ground which is all we can hope for in this
world."a' Absolutists may sneer at the compromising of interests,
but actually we can have few, if any, absolute principles in the
law, if the people, not the law, are to be masters. The rights of
free press and free speech come as near to creating absolute prin-
ciples as any fostered by our Constitution, but no informed person
would argue that they can be exercised without restraint. This is
fortunate since it would be perilous to unleash any principle,
16 Pound, Contemporary Juristic Theory, 75-76 (1940).
17 See Lee, Social Values and the Philosophy of Law, 32 Va. L. Rev. 802(1946), for an excellent analysis of the theory of "interests" as expounded by
Pound.
'- Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941), where Judge
Frank, in dissenting, stated that if courts take judicial notice of how shoeshine
parlors are run and of the kicking propensities of mules, judges should not be so
cloistered as to not know that the dominant purpose of most men when engaged
in business is to seek customers and make profits.
1t Demogue, Analysis of Fundamental Nations (Modem French Legal Philoso-
phy, in the Modem Legal Philosophy Series, 1921) 394, 413, 570.
1965]
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regard it as absolute, and let it work its way, uncurbed, to its
logical extreme.2
Thus conceived, law is a conventional part of a social organi-
zation which controls the relationship of individuals. As such, it
is an adjunct of community structure and not a quality or preroga-
tive of individual conduct. This concept is the antithesis of the
governmental doctrine that might is right and justice is the
interest of the stronger. Conventional law, then becomes formal
expressions of policy which are sanctioned by custom and usage.
That is, custom and usage as exemplified by the people and intel-
ligently propounded in statutes and decisions.-"
Rules of evidence are the very essence of law in action. One
may argue extremely, as did Thomas Hobbes, that law exemplifies
the absolute supremacy of political power over the individual.
But zealous upholders of the rights of the individual against
coercive state power-men like John Stuart Mill, Harold Laski
and Bertrand Russell-recognize that legal coercion is necessary
in order to prevent extra-legal coercion. We justify coercive
action by formal legal authority on the practical grounds of
maintaining peace and order, or the moral ground of establishing
justice, or the libertarian ground of attaining the greatest amount
of freedom for the greatest number and, finally, on the policy-
oriented ground of securing to individuals the right to a fair
return on their value judgments.22 These justifications defeat,
however cogent, the argument that law is opposed to individual
rights and demands. That is, the argument is defeated, if, as
stipulated by John Locke, the people have a voice in the legal
process and its results are in accord with the law of reason. In
other words, where the people have political freedom and par-
2 0 Our constitution is a series of compromises. Constitutional, as well as other
legal principles, have to live together in a democracy of ideas in which none is a
dictator. And, for example, the fact that due process has to yield to other powers
at times does not render it impotent. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S.Ct. 854, note 19 (1935).
21 judge Learned Hand quotes John Chipman Gray as saying of Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell that the Dean believed that the opinions of Judges,
like the utterances of Balaam's ass, imported absolute verity but presupposed no
conscious understanding in the being from whom they proceeded.
22 The right to realize both individual and group objectives results in equality
of rewards and earned fruits of the fight. But it guarantees to all men a free and
lawful choice of the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and, obtaining happiness. This concept is the opposite of social engineering which
bulldozes peaks into valleys, a leveler which achieves an equality of objectives
through the imposition of servitude,
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ticipate in the selection of decision-makers, they give by implica-
tion, if not expressly, their general consent to sanctions that are
employed for the good of the majority.
Under the foregoing conceptions of law, wisely applied rules
of evidence are the primary procedural devices for achieving
desired objectives through legal institutions in organized society.
Presumably these rules have as their purposes the reaching of
sound and just decisions under contemporary community stand-
ards by utilizing reliable sources of factual data,23 while:
1. Observing orderly judicial procedure,24
2. Avoiding violation of fundamental rights,25
3. Preserving certain social relationships, 26 and
4. Recognizing basic human dignity.27
It will be the purpose of this paper to examine policy con-
siderations and certain rules of evidence in the light of current
decisions in an attempt to determine whether or not proper and
sound decisions, as above described, are reached by our courts.
II. POLICY CONCEPTS
In the introductory remarks something was said with respect
to considerations of policy in its general relationship to rules of
evidence. Now it is quite clear that policy can be as broad as the
state's ability to entangle its national and international affairs in
the eternal struggle for prestige and well-being of the whole, or
23 It is quite conceivable that our courts have overworked the common law's
search for the best or highest degree of primary evidence. Too often valuable
opinion evidence is excluded and hearsay, though incompetent, may be highly
material to the issues being tried.
24 Civil and criminal rules of procedure have been greatly relaxed. We no
longer place a premium on form and the niceties of pleading and procedure.
However, formality cannot be entirely disregarded in judicial administration. So
written pleadings and rules of procedure, though simplified, still prevail in the
expedition of trials.
25 Rules of evidence exclude coerced confessions as unreliable and -revent
self-incrimination. An accused has the right to be present at all stages of a trial
and to be heard in his om defense, contrary to the early common law, if he so
desires.
26 Rules of privilege suppress valuable sources of evidence due to the fact
that the preservation of certain relationships, as husband-wife, attorney-client,
doctor-patient, priest-penitent and newsman-news source, is deemed to be an
overriding factor.2 7 Methods of securing evidence which are so brutal as to shock the conscience
and smack of the rack and the screw, as the use of a stomach pump on an
immobilized victim, are held to constitute a violation of due process of law.
-Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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as restricted as the rules and limitations that circumscribe John
Smith in his determined search for social status in suburban life.
Policy can be a soothing panacea, as fascinating as a chimera
and as slippery as an equalitarian Marxist. It can be a smoke-
screen for a lack of sound reason, an excuse for positive bureau-
cratic action, or a bastion for maintenance of the status quo."8
On the other hand, policy in the law can and should be no more
than a basis for wise and conventional decisions. But the inherent
danger in policy is the chameleon-like qualities which it possesses
or with which it can be imbued. There is nothing so absurd
but that it may be defended on the ground of policy. Yet, there
is nothing so reasonable as that it may be explained or justified
by policy.
A. Policy and Reason
Policy as a functional concept can be both logical and
practical. This can be accomplished if policy exponents are
willing to be disreputably intelligible and void of windy verbiage,
qualities which are anathema to philosophers, or to stuffy pedants
who are prone to promulgation of pompous phrases marching
along in search of ideas. Thus, professional proponents of legal-
istic policy may reduce it to a science and, in the process, develop
a technical phraseology comprehensible only by their exclusive
devotees. This in turn may result in structural impediments
which are a barrier to communication between those few who
know and the many who ought to know. If policy precepts
degenerate into pure scholasticism and consequent weak ac-
ceptance of authority then we are faced with a feudal-like system
where, in the midst of an oasis of learning, popular ignorance
28 In V. T. C. Lines v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1958), the court,
in commenting on municipal immunity from liability in the exercise of govern-
mental functions stated, ". . . the immunity rule (although never clearly defined)
has become so imbedded in the common law of this state over the years that it has
become a definite part of our mores.... A change addresses itself to legislative
discretion and we must content ourselves with criticism of the rule which we have
created." The incongruity of this court's policy position is emphasized by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Indian Towing Company v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955), where he stated at page 63 of the opinion, ".... and it (the Government)
would thus push the courts into the non-governmental quagmire that has long
plagued the law of municipal corporations. A comparative study of the cases in
the forty-eight states will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the
decisions in each of the states are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos
that results when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound."
[Vol. 53,
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flourishes unquenched. This is an almost unavoidable evil if
concepts of policy are monastically isolated within the framework
of erudite structural terminology.
Policy as a mere word of convenience for the average man or
governmental official is often overworked as a meaningless cover-
up for meaningless action. However, in actual practice, policy
may relate to family, business, or government with realistic force.
The head of the family may enunciate policy standards designed
to curb delinquency in his progeny and promote domestic tran-
quility. Primary motivation may be dual in nature. But perhaps
parental satisfaction in the rectitude of offsprings takes pre-
cedence over the fact that society benefits from young men and
women not running afoul of the law. Likewise, in business the
policy of merchants may be largely for the protection of self-
interest. The policy of "no refunds" is intended to lend stability
to sales, while the policy expression that "the customer is always
right," if practiced assiduously, is calculated to prosper the busi-
ness through satisfied customers. Finally, the legal presumption
of innocence until proven guilty is a benign expression of policy
by which the governed is protected from arbitrary inquisition
and unjust conviction by the government. The benefits are
mutual in that ordinarily such policy tends to stabilize govern-
ment and guarantee the security of the person.
These commonplace illustrations represent three fundamental
relationships in organized society. They demonstrate that policy
considerations necessarily contemplate friction as a result of
group and individual activity. They show that policy is sometimes
grounded in reason and always selfish, whether self-imposed or
pronounced by formal sanction. That is, the wise decision maker
seeks a policy pronunciation:
1. That can be justified in reason and logic,
2. That will be respected and observed by those affected by
its impact, and
3. That may be expected to add to the prestige and sense of
well-being enjoyed by the source of authority.
By reason in policy we mean not ground or cause alone but
rational justification. One may agree with Kant's denial of a
rational theology with a reduction of religion to mere faith and
19651
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hope.29 And one may concur in Spinoza's conclusion that the
purpose of the Scriptures is not to convince the reason but to
attract and lay hold of the imagination, since man, as a part of
the masses, wants religious beliefs substantiated by extraordinary
manifestations rather than by commonplace forces of nature.2
But policy concerns itself with justice as a relation among
individuals depending on social organization 1 In consequence,
policy in the law must be justified, if at all, through worldly
utility and even expediency at times.
The cynic may wonder why persons who boast of professing
the Christian religion and its virtues-namely, love, joy, peace,
temperance, and charity to all men-should quarrel with such
rancorous animosity and display daily toward one another such
bitter hatred, that this, rather than the virtues they profess, is
the readiest criterion of their faith. But the realist knows that
man is motivated by greed and the desire for luxury which
tarnish his hope and reduce his striving for the unworldly and
more remote immortality objective. Men are acquisitive, ambi-
tious, competitive, and jealous. They soon tire of what they have,
and begin to yearn for what they have not; they seldom desire
anything unless it belongs to others since most things worth
having are possessed. The result is the encroachment of one
group upon the rights and territory of another with chaotic con-
sequences, in the absence of controlling policy which is effective
because respected and accepted.32
The nadir of legalistic perversion is reached when policy
becomes an instrument of oppression or of furthering selfish
interest by means of arbitrary or reactionary government, or when
decision-makers, whose function is to enlighten through reason
and wise choice, become the tools of obscurantism and political
tyranny. This process may exemplify practical expedients for
29 Kant, Practical Reason, 220.
30 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologieo-Politicus, Chap. 6.
31 Justice is, of course, an abstract, or ambiguously relative and can be
studied and analyzed only as part of the structure of a community rather than as a
quality of personal conduct.
32 Terivalry of groups ranges from communities to countries. The latter
instance usually concerns itself with the acquisition of the resources of soil. This
almost inevitably leads to strife and subjugation of one group. If that day ever
comes when those who must do the fighting have the right to dcide between war
and peace, the history of mankind will no longer be written in blood. That is,
demands and expectations vary directly with the price one knows he will have
to pay for their satisfaction.
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the few, but it ignores reason, which can be rational and practical
for all who are affected by formal sanctions. Generally, we think
of knowledge as translated experience, but pure reason may exist
entirely independent of anything empirical. This is so if it be
admitted that moral sense is innate and not necessarily derived
from experience. Proceeding on this thesis, it may be abundantly
clear that the most astounding reality in all experience is a sense
of rightness or wrongness when one is required or tempted to act.
If the right decision is made, the imperative demands of that
which is called conscience are followed. This avoids conduct
which would render social life impossible. An inner sense of duty
is followed and moral law legislates imperiously regardless of
profit or loss to the actor, but regardful of benefit to the majority.
So reason may be based on experience but in new situations it
operates independently of experience. Thus justice is achieved
through reason.
Where do rules of evidence fit into this picture of reason in
law? Rules of evidence are a basic procedural part of the whole
legal process dedicated to achieving the ends of justice within
reason. They are the very hub of the wheel of justice in that they
regulate the fact-finding process by a pre-determination of what
facts have probative value and are competent for consideration
in reaching decisions. In this respect, rules of evidence are
significant, if not unique, in the legal process by standing not
only for a right to justice under the law but for a way to justice
as well. The crucial subject of inquiry is how well these laudable
objectives are achieved in the process of formulating standards
and exercising control over social behavior.
B. Activation of Legal Policy
Every society, with the exception of totalitarian states, and
every social group, capable of consistent and effective action
must be regarded as an organization to prosper the wishes of its
members. This means that society furthers the natural desires
of its members subject to disciplines and controls in the interest
of the group as a whole. This generally accepted democratic
postulate is contrary to the philosophic proposition that natural
justice and nobility consist in every man allowing his desires to
wax to the uttermost, with the courage and intelligence to
minister to and satisfy them to the fullest. If such freedom of
1965]
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action is accepted, justice becomes a morality not for men but
for foot-men, and, as expressed by Stirner, "a handful of might is
better than a bagful of right."
Fortunately, this is not the concept of a well-organized society
as we know it in which the dignity of the individual is stressed.
This is fortunate despite the fact that every government even-
tually tends to perish through excessive exploitation of its basic
principles.33 Disregarding this unhappy thought, we may say that
the state is the most significant and most fully developed institu-
tion in our society. 4 And the standards of conduct which it
formulates through institutional practices is the law. This is done
through relatively formal methods of defining aims and form-
ulating its policies to be realized through machinery or agencies
established for that purpose. These facts are elementary. The
why and the how of them are quite complex. This is so because
men are complex contradictions. We have described men as
acquisitive by nature. On the other hand, we have said that man
has an innate sense of right and wrong. In our society, this has
aided him in yielding to formal authority, whether by choice or
of necessity. The desirability of fostering mutual or off-setting
objectives is a result of choice. The requirement that one so
regulate his conduct as to not violate recognized personal or
property rights of others is dictated by necessity.
The state in a democratic society is organized on the basic
premise which holds to the equal right of all its citizens to hold
office and to determine public policy. As has been suggested
this could lead to a disastrous excess of democracy. Perhaps an
excess of democracy is as dangerous to the existence of a well-
organized society as is an excess of totalitarianism, or any form
of government for that matter. But the former only suggests a
weakness which may ultimately lead to this excess, while in the
33 An oligarchy ruins itself by the incautious struggle for immediate wealth.
An aristocracy destroys itself by limiting too narrowly the circle within which
power is confined. Tesame is true of a dictatorship. A democracy becomes
decadent and bankrupt because its benevolence leads to destruction of initiative
in the welfare state. The end result is upheaval or revolution in which the
equalitarian terrorists consume their own. From the ashes a newly organized
society emerges in the governmental cycle.
34Advocates of states' rights can make a strong case to the contrary by
arguing that federal subsidies and Supreme Court decisions have reduced states
to a position of vassalage. However, we speak of states at this point with
reference to dispensation of local justice, an area in which the federal octopus has
made only small inroads as yet.
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latter excess is from the beginning a fait accompli. So, in a
manner of speaking, we accept the lesser of two evils, and reject
the idea that a democracy exemplifies the folly of leaving to mob
caprice and gullibility the selection of political officials; officials
who are mere puppets for wealth-serving strategists pulling the
strings of special interests behind the democratic stage. Rather,
we adhere to the view that free people do know what is best for
them and are capable of selecting the proper rulers for charting
the wisest courses and determining the soundest policies. 35 If it
be otherwise, then the governed do not deserve to be free and
would be better served by a despotically imposed pattern of
regulatory policy.
From the foregoing it may be concluded that the democratic
process is predicated on the proposition that the controlled and
the controllers are in harmonious accord to the extent that those
who consent to be governed as members of a politically organized
group recognize, tacitly or otherwise, that authoritative directives
are actually the people speaking through their own agencies.
In the abstract, this sounds ideal. In practice, it may be less than
ideal. This does not mean that the system is bad. It simply
indicates that since man is not infallible the state which he
creates cannot be infallible. 6 Man is avid and grasping but
35 Plato argued (Georgias, 588, Protogoras 317, 565) that the common people
lacked the intellect and education to select political officers, and that mob-rule is
a rough sea for the ship of state to ride when oratory stirs the waters and deflects
the course. He, of course, spoke of his time and for his time in history. An
analogy to this argument may be drawn from the retired J.A.G.C. officer who
has written a book for the purpose of lauding military justice and condemning
civil courts in bitter language.-Sullivan, Trial by Newspaper (Patriot Press, 1961).
Perhaps military justice may be good for officers but buck privates think other-
wise. It has its wealmess, but mankind has not yet devised a more just means of
trial in criminal prosecutions than trial by jury. Similarly, free men prefer to
govern themselves, capable or not by some standards.
U It is interesting to note that in the slippery, shifting, self-seeking, cynical
Renaissance politics of Europe a burgeoning consciousness of nationalism created
a totally new concept of individualism and the state. It was nothing less than the
infallibility of the state. That is to say, the infallibility not of a man, not of a
religion, but of a geographical area. That a Pope might claim infallible dominion
over one's conscience, or a king over one's land was an ancient habit of thought
deeply rooted in men's mind and seldom questioned. But that the newly con-
stituted national states, whose boundaries were hardening, might also lay claim
to infallibility was new. Merely by being a patriotic Frenchman or a patriotic
Englishman or a patriotic Spaniard, the meanest peasant, by the accident of his
birth within certain confines of national boundaries, might arrogate to himself the
infallibility of popes and dngs. He could say to himself, with growing wonder and
pride, "I too cannot err, since my nation cannot err, and I am a loyal national."
While this new spirit of well-being was growing, in Italy Niccolo Machiavilli was
writing a book on the new philosophy. This is nationalism. Today, in Africa,
(Continued on next page)
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knows right from wrong, since he has a conscience and the power
to reason. So he yields, as a conforming member of society, and
subordinates his personal demands for the good of the whole
when contrary to group objectives. This he does by choice or
perforce as the case may be. This observance of state policy
standards can be expected to continue so long as formal policy
truly represents the contemporary will of the people. But when,
and if, policy becomes an arbitrary tool for exploiting the masses,
for the benefit of those exercising political power, the result is an
unjustified excess of the governmental function-even in a democ-
racy. This leads to revolution and possibly a new political order
in nation-states. Certainly freedom or subjugation of the people
follows. If freedom, a vague term or status at best, results, there
may be an excessive exercise of freedom, with anarchy rampant,
until the fires of unlicensed disorganization burn themselves out
and one of the contending power groups is able to acquire a
position of authority.37 Unbridled power, be it exercised by a
select few or the masses, and liberty are eternal enemies and
lead to conflict. A state should never, willingly at least, abandon
its fate to an authority it cannot control.38 Similarly, the people
cannot, of choice, be expected to create a governmental Franken-
stein.
In a so called democratic society, the state, as well as other
institutions or organizations within the state, possess certain
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Banteur, Bushman and Hottentot are emerging from their tribal society and
acquiring a new sense of self-satisfaction and dignity in identifying themselves
with the state and its supposed infallibility as a nationalistic unit.
37 The French revolution went out of control when it subordinated the liberties
of men to the power of a government immediately responsive to egualitarian mobs.
The libertarians, Turgot, Necker and Lafayette, were replaced by the radicals,
Barnave, Condorcet and Mirabeau. In due course these were turned out by the
more radical Girondons. They in turn fell-with heads off-before the ruthless
Jacobins. Desmoulins, Robespierre, Marat, Ballaud played their brief parts and
passed over the horizon of French history, many instigators of French liberty, who
had fought in the American revolution, passed with it. The Duc de Lauzun
and Victor de Broglie went to the scaffold. Barbe-Marbois, a friend of Jefferson,
found safety in obscurity. Alexandre de Beauharnais was beheaded. Ethis de
Corny, friend of Washington and Hamilton, lost his mind over the excesses of the
revolution and died insane. Custine, who distinguished himself at Yorktown, was
executed as was Arthur Dillon. D'Estainy, the great French admiral, was guil-
lotined. Lafayette, shocked and heart-broken by the excesses of the revoultion,
to which he had helped give original impetus, left France to be cast as a
prisoner of state into a dungeon at Olmutz. See, Rosenthal, America and France,
271 et seq. (1882).
38 The textual observation calls to mind the oft repeated statement of Lord
Acton that 'Tower corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
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features common to all. The essence of each is controlled delega-
tion of power to effectuate common purposes deemed beneficial
in the futherance of individual and group objectives. These
common features are:
1. Division of members into tvo functional parts: governors
and governed,
2. Institutional or group objectives,
3. Standards of behavior for members (the governed),
4. Devices or methods for controlling those who exercise
granted powers (the governors), and
5. Means for securing group objectives.
This simple but comprehensive break-down demonstrates of
itself how people in a society seek to achieve desired goals
through associated activity.
The group of persons involved may represent a state, munici-
pality, labor union or medical association. Basically, we are con-
cerned with politically organized groups which traditionally
seek such contemporary objectives as:
1. Preservation of peace and order,
2. Security of acquisitions,
3. Security of transactions,
4. Protection of social institutions and standards,
5. Production of an adequate but not excessive supply of
goods,
6. Favorable working conditions,
7. A fair distribution of goods,
8. Conservation of natural resources,
9. Development of knowledge,
10. Dissemination of knowledge,
11. Favorable living conditions for all, and
12. Unemployment and old age security.
The foregoing enumeration of objectives are representative
of a highly developed state of society; a society which in its rudi-
mentary stages first recognized the necessity of preserving peace
and order; then from this starting point gradually becomes more
complex as new objectives become desirable and possible of




1. The fact that time works a change in objectives as desires
broaden in direct relation to the availability of services
and things.
2. Objectives are evolving with respect to controllers and
controlled. That is, the judge in criminal prosecutions may
become a defendant in civil litigation. And a large corpora-
tion may find itself the subject of an anti-trust suit.
3. They evince a desire for the full and good life for all in
enjoyment of material benefits.
4. Each and every one may be achieved through legal institu-
tions in a self-governing society.
These objectives of a well-organized democratic society which
we have listed are broad basic policy concepts which require
origination, development, interpretation and application once
accepted as sound policy objectives. For example, the basic
premise that favorable working conditions for labor are desirable
is subject to development and refinement under contemporary
policy thinking. This is necessarily true because that which was
accepted as sound policy a generation, or even a decade ago, may
be regarded as absurd today.39 Again, with respect to courts,
"coffffee break" injuries may be held compensable; 40 a court may
discard negligence as a test for liability and adopt a rule of
absolute liability in "blasting" cases,4 ' or abrogate the rule of
charitable immunity for hospitals in view of present day changes
in group objectives; 42 a court may once again respect stare decisis
and the venerable M'Naghten Rules,43 or break with tradition
and accept realistic, modem views on mental disorders; 44 and,
conceivably might even let down the judicial hair and admit
testimony by an expert, retired burglar that a particular job, in
3s In 1845 a committee of the Massachusetts legislature investigated working
conditions in the Lowell textile mills. The members were unmoved by the fact
that women worked with woolen fabrics in ill-lighted, ill-ventilated factories from
5 o'clock a.m., and continued till 7 o'clock p.m. with half an hour for breakfast and
45 minutes for lunch, for wages averaging from $16 to $23 per month. One of the
committee's conclusions in its report was, "It would be impossible to restrict the
hours of labor, without affecting very materially the question of wages; and that
is a matter which experience has taught us can be much better regulated by the
parties themselves than by the Legislature. -Documentary History of American
Industrial Society, Vol. VIII, 184, Massachusetts House Document No. 50,
March, 1845.
40 Sweet v. Kolosky, 106 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1961).41 Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., Inc., 117 S.E.2d 859 (S.C. 1961).42 Mary Kojis v. Doctors Hosital, 107 N.W.2d 131 (Wis. 1961).
43 State v. Andrews, 357 P.2d 789 (Kan. 1961).4 4 Durham v. United States, 94 App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
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his opinion, was performed by a rank amateurY. These sug-
gestions indicate that legal policy is essentially and necessarily
progressive in nature if it speaks in terms of present needs.
In home and business the exercise of policy is substantially
personal or private, although mutual benefits to the individual
and the public result. In government, expressions of policy are
fundamentally public in nature. This is so regardless of the fact
that governing or regulatory bodies may hope to perpetuate
themselves in office through wise admonitions or sound direc-
tives to the governed and, in this respect, possess attributes
which are private or personal in nature. Thus, official control
presumably is exercised in the general interest and is public. If
the general interest is individualized by decisions which accom-
modate themselves to particular circumstances then public policy
has no direct relationship to value judgments formulated by con-
stitutions, statutes and prior judicial decisions. Rather, public
policy becomes the product of individual judicial discovery of
what is naturally and inherently right between man and man,
and man and society in particular factual situations.46 This is, of
course, not necessarily a subsversion of policy action and may
even be desirable in relieving from the rigors of harsh justice-
and may be so desirable as to evolve into a general rule of policy.
At times, public policy is declared by constitutions; at other
times it is enunciated by statute or ordinance; and at times by
judicial decisions. However, it has been argued that more often
than not policy abides in the customs and conventions of the
people-in their clear consciousness and conviction of what is
fundamentally right and just in men's relations." It may be true
41 Central Mutual Ins. Co. v. D. & B. Inc., 340 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960).
46 In Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 68-69,
115 N.E. 505, 506 (1918) the court held that a contract relieving the employer
of liability for negligence causing injury to an employee was contrary to public
policy. At the date of this case the decision was an innovation. It benefited a
particular employee, but general application today makes the rule public in
character. We accept the fact that a contract by which a person seer to put
another at the mere) of his own negligent conduct is unconscionable.
47 The Florida Supreme Court so described public policy in, City of Leesburg
v. Ware, 113 Fla. 760, 153 So. 87, 89 (1934). Statements as to right and naturaljustice have always been under fire. Socrates in one of his Dialogues, which remain
one of the priceless treasures of the world, wrote, "I proclaim that might is right
and justice is the interest of the stronger."-The Republic, 838. Plato in the
dialogue, Gorgias, 491, expounded that, "He who would truly live ought to
allow his desires to wa' to the uttermost; but when they have grown to their
Continued on next page)
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that public policy purportedly regards the primary principles of
justice and equity and is at times formally expressed under con-
cepts of social and industrial justice as conceived by our body
politic. Further, if a course of conduct is cruel or shocking to the
average man's conception of justice, it may be that such conduct
is obviously contrary to public policy, though it has never been
formalized by constitution, statute or decree of court. But, if this
hypothesis is accepted as a truism, how is the particular policy
activated? If certain conduct is contrary to some provision of a
constitution, is it sound to urge that it is prohibited by the
constitution and not by public policy? If such conduct is con-
trary to a statutory provision or a settled line of judicial decisions
is it correct to state it is prohibited by the law of the land rather
than by public policy?
The fallacy of these statements on what public policy is not
is obvious. Public policy, more often than not, is a composite of
various elements. But, who is to brew this composite? A well-
known example aids a search for the answer. At one time writers
were vociferously divided on the question whether courts should
enforce "yellow-dog" contracts by which employees agreed, as a
condition to employment, not to join labor unions. In the Hitch-
man case, decided in 1917, the Supreme Court upheld such a
contract as a matter of public policy.48 Years later, when Con-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them, and to
satisfy all his longings. And this I affnn to be natural justice and nobility."
Nowhere in the history of philosophy is the doctrine better formulated than by
Plato in his Gorgias. It is a doctrine which in these times is associated with
Friedrich Nietzsche. He wrote, "Verily I laughed many a time over the weaklings
who thought themselves good because they had lame paws."-Thus spake
Zarathustra, New York, 166 (1906). Stimer expressed the idea briefly when he
said that "a handful of might is better than a bagful of right." As for Nietzsche,
he was an incorrigible saint who longed to be a sinner, and whose outward synic-
ism, sharp as a surgeon's knife, laid bare some hidden roots of morality.
48 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). In Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court held that a statute which
limited the working hours of bakery employees to ten hours a day and a maximum
of sixty hours per week was an illegal interference with the freedom of contract
But Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting wrote, "This case is decided upon an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question
whether I agree with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long
before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law." It is Vorth noting that the
majority opinion was prophetic in remarking, "This interference on the part of the




gress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act,49 specifically outlawing
this anti-union contract, not a legislative voice was raised in
protest. Just two years prior to this enactment, in 1930, the
Senate had rejected the nomination of Judge John J. Parker to a
position on the Supreme Court, largely because he had followed
and applied the rule in the Hitchman case. ' ° These actions
represented a new philosophy for labor-management relations,
spawned in the depression-fighting days of the New Deal govern-
ment and fostered by defense spending under conditions of
world turmoil and conflagration. But most significant of all, an
awakening of formal authority to the existence of social and
economic injustice in a particular area is indicated. This awaken-
ing was brought about by reason of:
1. Widespread economic distress,
2. Political power wvielded by economic underdogs, and
3. Recognition of economic inequality by governmental agen-
cies empowered to act.
Major policy decisions are almost invariably the result of a
clash between interest groups with one yielding and the legisla-
ture, or other decisional agency, being moved to action when the
weaker becomes strong enough to successfully challenge the
stronger. To a lesser degree, and to a limited extent, this power
struggle for recognition of human rights is imbedded in rules of
evidence. This is, for example, evidenced by the change from
inquisitorial to accusatorial methods of indictment and trial of
criminal offenses. John Lilbun's trial before the Star Chamber
led to this change and development of the rule against self-
incrimination when he refused to answer to charges of sedition.5'
Lilburn was a libertarian as obstinate as the court was high-
handed. He was whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in
refusing to take a legal oath." Three years later, when the Long
Parliament met he laid before it his complaint of this treatment,
and after four years more, the Lords set aside his conviction,
4947 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1932).-Commonly referred to as the
Anti-Injunction Act.50 U.M.W.A. v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 889(C.C.A. 4th, 1927).
51 AcCormick Evidence, Self-Incrimination, 254 (1954). Though constitu-
tionally guaranteed this is an evidentary rule of privilege when applied by the
courts,
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"it being contrary to the laws of God, nature and the Kingdom
for any man to be his own accuser."
C. Factors Influencing Policy
Law regulates human behavior. It suppresses behavioristic
responses to stimuli when considered anti-social, and encourages
that behavior when deemed socially desirable. The stimuli gov-
erning human conduct are those forces, tangible or intangible,
which create desire, arouse emotion, or stimulate a quest for
knowledge.5 These are the controlling factors or qualities of the
personality structure which are the sources of behavior. All
human value judgments can be categorized within the three.
Desire causes the acquisitive restless soul to be absorbed in
quests for the material things of life. For those motivated by
desire, existing gains are empty as compared with attainable
goals. Desire caused men to rape, pillage and bum in feudal
societies. Today, it causes men to manipulate stocks, dominate
industry, consolidate efforts, mortgage the home, or buy cars and
applicances on the installment plan in highly developed societies.
Desire varies in direct ratio to the rationality of objectives, with
the complexity of society as the polestar of behavior.
While some humans are the veritable embodiment of desire,
others are completely the product of their emotions. They fight
not so much for principles as for the pure joy of a fight. Their
pride is in such manifestations as love, hate, power and justice.
These men make and move armies and navies of the world and
explore the cosmic unknown. Or, they may be crusaders with a
cause. With pious dedication, they sought the Holy Grail in the
age of chivalry. Today they strive for liberty, freedom and
equality for all men, in the guise of democracy or, perhaps, under
the hammer and sickle of communism.
Lastly, there are those men who find supreme gratification in
meditation and understanding. Men of this group think not of
material goods, nor of victory in combative activity. Rather,
theirs is an endless thirsting for knowledge. If the desire is
knowledge for knowledge's sake, then they may stand in the
5 2 Desire, emotion and knowledge as powers and qualities are present in all
Men in varying degrees. These basic constituents may lie comparatively dormant,
or become compulsions which giverdriving force subderivatives as ambition,
courage, devotion and intellectual curiosity.
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wings of life's stage unused and unwanted by the world. But if
they seek knowledge to impart knowledge and improve the lot
of mankind, then they are a constructive adjunct to communal
growth and development. The man of this division who once
went about with a lantern cynically seeking an honest man now
spreads the light of reason and knowledge by putting men in
outer space.
In this picture of man in society, the law must fit itself in a
meaningful way in order to promote desire, emotion and knowl-
edge within the range of legitimate individual and group objec-
tives. Those ends are sought through wise policy decisions,
within the rule of law, by means of carefully chosen political
leaders. 3 Utopia may never be reached in any form of govern-
mental structure, but it is a desirable goal in the social control
of human behavior. Due to the inevitable presence of the human
factor in all regulation of social intercourse, how far society falls
short of or how near it approaches perfect achievement of desired
ends depends upon perfection and imperfection in man and
man-made institutions as influenced by internal and external
motivating forces. 4
Man is a complex contradiction, a dichotomous paradox. His
desires, emotions and knowledge are locked in endless conflict.
The struggle is exemplified by selfish and unselfish interests
which are stimulated by the desire to gratify personal needs on
the one hand and the desire to be socially in harmony on the
other. These two objectives may, and often do, conflict. So man
is moral and immoral, aggressive and non-aggressive, honest and
dishonest, tolerant and intolerant in the never ending cycle of
living in a world in which competition for advantage is ordained
by nature. In this maelstrom of living, which is nothing more
than the adjustment of personality structure to social environ-
53 In simple matters like shoe-making and watch repairing we insist upon
technically trained men but, unfortunately, in politics and government we tend to
assume that anyone who has the capacity to get votes knows how to legislate,
make decisions and administer the affairs of a state or municipality. This is
democracy. Not the most efficient method of government as such, but the best
known means of insuring that the governed will keep control of the governors.
And, through painful trial and error, competent leaders are secured or trained.
G4 Plato emphasized that behind all political problems there lies the nature of
man. Like man, like state. Governments vary as the characters of men vary.
States are made out of the human natures which are in them. The state is what
it is because its citizens are what they are. We need not expect to have better
states until we have better men.-Protagoras, 544, 575.
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ment, those persons who are chosen to make decisions are
motivated and controlled by certain innate and acquired char-
acteristics. They guide one's hand, color his thinking and influ-
ence his decisions in varying degrees. They are:
a. Ethics and ideals
b. Intellectual capacity
c. Political inclinations
d. Environmental background; personality structure
e. Personal prestige
f. Social security
Sub-headings a and b are properly described as unselfish
motivating forces. Factors c and d may be defined graphically
as built-in controls. The final enumerations, e and f, are recog-
nizable as selfishly motivated.
a. Ethics and Ideals
Perhaps the most astounding reality in all our experience is
precisely our moral sense, our inescapable feeling, in the face of
temptation, that this or that is wrong. We may yield but the
feeling is there nevertheless. Le Matin je fais des projects et le
soir je fais des sottisesr5 but we know that they are sottises, and
we resolve again. What is it that brings the bite of remorse and
the new resolution? It is the categorical imperative in us, the
unconditional command of our conscience,5" to avoid a social
behavior. The conscience is a mental faculty or awareness that
we must avoid behavior, which if adopted by all men would
render rational social life impossible. The conscience of man
gives him ideals and a sense of ethical conduct. To what extent
do ethics and ideals control decisions which make policy state-
ments to regulate the affairs of men? Is it measurable?
Legalistic policy is in reality practical or applied philosophy.
It inquires into the values and ideal possibilities of things with
regard to their total and final significance in legal controls for
55 "In the morning I make good resolutions; in the evening I commit follies."
56 Conscience is the sense or consciousness of the moral goodness or blame-
worthiness of one's own conduct, intentions or character, together with a feeling of
obligation to do right or be good. It is a faculty, power, or principle conceived
to decide as to the moral quality of one's own thoughts or acts, enjoining what is
good. Conscience may be exaggerated or stilled by traumatic experience. In some
respects it is purely contemporary. But properly developed in the socially adjusted
person it is the intangible that chooses good over evil and makes group activity
oth potsible and pleasant,
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patterns of conduct. By and large policy, which seeks answers
to new problems, involves hard and hazardous tasks not yet open
to scientific methods. These problems often present choices
between such matters as good and evil, order and freedom, and
life and death. Science, as suggested in Turgenev's poem, is as
impartial as nature and as interested in the leg of a flea as is the
creative throes of genius. But law and policy are not content
with study of isolated facts-they cannot be. Rather, they must
relate facts to experience, which may or may not yet be formal-
ized as legal sanctions, and get at their meaning and worth in
the light of societal objectives.
All men of conscience and intellect are motivated by idealism
and ethics, though just as assuredly this motivation must contend
for dominance at times with other facets of the personality which
are baser in nature. Likewise, men's sense of ideals and ethics
are contemporary in that they are influenced by current thinking
in social, economic and political arenas. Just as music moulds
character and, therefore, shares in determining social and political
issues, 7 so do ideals and ethics tend to mould men and the
government by law which they create. So influenced, men have
a sense of duty and tend to do what they think is right and just
when required to act. But since actions are outward manifesta-
tions of inward sensitivity, so may we expect differences of
opinion as to what is right and just in particular cases. In brief,
this explains to some extent the divided judicial decision, and the
split vote on pending legislation. Absent evidence to the con-
trary, we assume that each legislator and each judge voted
according to the dictates of his conscience-buttressed by his
sense of ideals and ethics. The extent to which they guided and
controlled the law-maker is not measurable, but we can be sure
these intangible forces were at work.
Ethics and ideals as here used are closely related to morals
and humility of man: Humility, which causes one to decide on a
course of action irrespective of personal pride or gain,58 and
57 Plato, Protagoras, 826.-"Damon tells me, and I can quite believe it,
that -,hen modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the state change with
them." Daniel O'Connell: "Let me write the songs of a nation, and I care not
who makes the laws."5s True humility is strength not weakness. It is not the cloak of hypocrisy or
the badge of a slave. True humility is the rarest of all human virtues. Even
(Continued on next pae)
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morality, the good will-will to follow concepts of moral law
regardless of profit or loss.59 Morality and humility clash with
political inclinations and desire for prestige and security in the
decisional process as we shall see. Yet they are the voices, at
times wee small voices, which prod man's conscience and urge
him to do his moral duty. In so doing he will not achieve the
perfection that philosophers speak of, but he will treat others, in
this instance the governed, in every case as an end, never only
as a means.
According to our established postulate, men, including those
called upon to make laws and decisions, engage in a struggle of
contending forces, one of them being the sense of right and duty
which is the product of ethics and ideals. Logically then, con-
stitutions and statutes should constitute formal expressions of
the ideals and ethics of a community as of the time, if decision-
makers act by reason of a sense of moral duty, and if sensitive to
the demands and desires of a majority of the community. 0
Constitutions and statutes reflect the ideals and ethics of the
community-be it good or bad by extrinsic standards. The same
is true with respect to judicial decisions interpreting these canons,
as well as in applying rules of evidence in the process. For
example, constitutions, state and federal, provide safeguards
against self-incrimination and illegal search and seizure. Statutes,
through "anti-sweating" acts prohibit the use of coerced con-
fessions in criminal prosecutions. Courts then interpret and
apply, or refuse to apply, these constitutional or statutory pro-
visions in determining if particular testimony or evidence comes
within the interdiction. These sanctions against conduct which
shocks the conscience, ignores concepts of human dignity, and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
philosophers who write books in its praise take care to have their names
prominently displayed on the title page.
59 Surely there is an innate sense of morality in man, even though it is subject
to a process of evolution as is man. Just as surely ethical notions based on
morality, were never more confused than today. The principles which we apply to
our actual living are largely opposite to what we write in books and preach in our
churches. Carried to its logical extremity this hypocritical incongruity leads to
excesses of self-fulfillment and the eventual breakdown of legal and democratic
processes.
60 The hypothetical "if" presupposes knowledge of what the people want and
a sense of duty or obligation to serve those wants. The strait-laced legislator or
judge with preconceived prejudices for conduct deemed undesirable or immoral by
him, acts under a sense of duty to the people but is moved by what he thinks is
best for the people rather than by what they think is best for themselves.
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disregards the privacy of person and property are codified
expressions of a particular society. The courts in applying these
sanctions make policy decisions which regulate conduct and
mutual rights. It is sound, practical policy if it has not become
the monopolistic brain-child of an esoteric class and isolated
from the people by the high birth rate of obscure terminology,
and if it is expressive of the will of the majority.
The inquiry then becomes, assuming that judges do their
duty as they see it, do decisions represent the ideals of the people
or the ideals of the judges? This inquiry is illustrated by the
issue as to the admissibility of evidence secured by unreasonable
search and seizure. Certainly the security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police is basic to a free society,
is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and grounded in due
process of law. Yet Justice Cardozo once spoke out in favor of
the traditional rule of admissibility in these words:"1
No doubt the protection of the statute would be greater from
the point of view of the individual whose privacy has been
invaded if the government were required to ignore what it
had learned through the invasion. The question is whether
protection for the individual would not be gained at a dis-
proportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side
is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other,
the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence
of office. There are dangers in any choice. The rule of admis-
sibility strikes a balance between opposing interests. We must
hold it to be the law until those organs of governed by which
a change of public policy is normally effected shall give notice
to the courts that the change has come to pass.
The contrary and more logical, although minority, view favor-
ing the rule of exclusion has been commented on as follows by
justice Learned Hand:62
As we understand it, the reason for exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is
that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the con-
stitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough,
01 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).02 United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (C.C.A. 2d 1945). In Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court applied the fourth amendment
through the fourteenth amendment to prohibit the use in state courts of evidence
which was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
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but that is true no longer. Only, in case the prosecution,
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows it cannot profit
by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.
In an issue on the admission or exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence, it is difficult to see how admission strikes a balance
between opposing interests, as suggested by Cardozo. More to
the point, it is not difficult to understand how two outstanding
jurists would take directly opposing views in a field or area of
evidence so steeped in policy. The why of this judicial divergence
on an issue where public and private interests clash presents,
however, a most intriguing question. One judge votes to protect
the public against the individual who has erred, while the other
votes to protect the individual against unwarranted exercise of
power by the state in identical situations. One sees the evils of
crime and the need to suppress it, one sees excesses of police
authority and the need to suppress it. Each is equally discerning
and equally honest in convictions and dedication to duty. Why
then do we get opposite views or results?
The answer to the question becomes apparent upon reflective
analysis. Men of science with required qualifications can run
identical tests or use certain formulae which are scientifically
exact and will produce the same results or findings. But men
equally trained in the law cannot be expected to examine a set of
facts and invariably reach the same decision as to what is good
or bad, or right or wrong. This is so because they inquire into
values and the ideal possibilities of things. And man is not alone
an ideal or ethical animal. His personality structure is integrated.
It is the sum total of his traits of character. So what a particular
judge decides is right or just depends not upon his isolated ideals,
but upon ideals as conceived by him as a result of his entire
personality. When a decision-maker's field of inquiry yields
knowledge susceptible of exact formulation it becomes a science.
In that event, possibility of error is at a minimum as is policy
making. The facts may conclusively prove intoxication or exclude
paternity to which two or more judges would and must react
alike. But in deliberating upon relativities such as good and evil,
beauty and ugliness, hate and love, or order and freedom, lawyer
or judge brings the entirety of his value judgments to bear on
the problem in a process of interpretive synthesis.
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The significance of the ethics and ideals factor in decisions
is highlighted by the Rochin 3 and Breithaupt64 decisions of the
Supreme Court. In Rochin, the majority of the court found that
immobilizing a suspect by force and pumping his stomach to
secure incriminating evidence in the form of morphine capsules
violated due process of law in that the police methods employed
were such as to "shock the conscience" and "approach the rack
and the screw". Then in Breithaupt, the majority held that
taking blood by hypodermic needle from an unconscious person
to secure evidence of into.xication for use in an anticipated
prosecution for manslaughter by motor vehicle was not "such
conduct as shocks the conscience" of the community within
Rochin. Both Rochin and Breithaupt were split decisions. In a
dissent to Breithaupt, Justices Warren, Black and Douglas ex-
pressed the belief that the decision removed meaning and validity
from the Rochin case and caused it to mean no more than per-
sonal revulsion against particular police methods.
It is not within the purpose of this writing to criticize or
defend the two decisions by arguing that they can or cannot be
rationalized or reconciled. Rather it is "personal revulsion" of
the judges referred to in the dissent which raises an interesting
and relevant point of discussion. The majority in distinguishing
Breithaupt from Rochin stated that the taking of blood from an
unconscious person by a skilled technician was not such "conduct
that shocks the conscience-referring, not to the conscience of an
inordinately sensitive person but the sense of fairness and
decency of the whole community-under the indiscriminate con-
ditions which prevailed in the Rochin case."
In this statement by the court, we are faced directly with the
policy-packed consideration of what is right and just. What is
right and just depends on the ideals and ethics of the one called
upon to make a determination. Can the Supreme Court, or any
03 Rochin v. California, 842 U.S. 165 (1952).
64 Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). In Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 420, 141 S.W.2d 341 (1940), the Texas Court was not repelled by the force-
fil use of an enema to recover stolen rings which the suspect swallowed when
apprehended. Yet, in Akodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. Rep. 593, 146 S.W.2d 881(1941), the same court a year later held that forcibly requiring a person, accused
of drunken driving, to provide a specimen of urine and do such things as touch his
nose and attempt to walk a straight line constituted compulsory self-incrimination.




court, determine for the community that it would be shocked by
enforced stomach pumping and not by taking of blood from an
unconscious person? It cannot do so any more than a trial jury
can objectively determine how the mythical reasonable man
would act. In reality, the jury becomes the reasonable man and
the judges become the conscience of the community in reaching
required decisions. This is by no means inherenently bad. Jurors
can be reasonable men and judges can be fair men with unre-
tarded consciences and well-developed senses of right and wrong.
Thus equipped, the court inquires as to how an unduly sensitive
person and an ordinarily sensitive person would react to the
questioned investigative procedures. It then applies its own tests
as to what is shocking and what is not shocking to the ordinary
man in the community. The decision then becomes a policy
expression acceptable to the community-the court hopes. In
this manner, the judge's own sense of right and wrong as meas-
ured by the ideals and ethics he entertains is an integral and
highly significant part of the decision making process.
b. Intellectual Capacity
In the preceding section the fact that a decision is the product
of a judges or juror's total personality was stressed. Factual
situations which become operative facts of the law are derived
not alone from special training but from total experience includ-
ing peculiar drives and preferences. This means that there can
be no decision in the law, or any other field of human endeavor
for that matter, which is purely intellectual because these con-
tributing factors inevitably detract from the purity of one's
reasoning. Does this not also detract from Llewellyn's thesis
that "wherever a rule is clear, and plainly wise, and plainly
applicable, a judge not only can follow it, but it can be predicted
that he will?"65 It does, even without recourse to the many
variables in fact-finding and the well-known unpredictability of
B5 Llewellyn, My Philosophy of Law, 183 191, 196, 197 (1941). Felix
Cohen mi discussing the prediction of rules and principles that courts will use
stated, "There is at present no publication showing the political, economic and
professional background and activities of our various judges. Such a reference
work would be exceedingly valuable, not only to the professional lawyer who
wants to bring a motion or try a case before a sympathetic judge, but also to a
disinterested study of the law. Such a judicial index is not published however,
because it would be disrespectable. According to the classical theory, those things
(Continued on next page)
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trial juries in applying the law for further detraction. Enough
has been written about the desirability of predictability in the
law, too much in fact, for the point to be conceded. At the same
time, the fact-finder or decision-maker who applies legal rules
mechanically is like the physician who preferred that patients
should die by the rule rather than live contrary to it. But
mechanical jurisprudence will never prevail so long as judges
have imagination and are motivated by humanizing variables.
One of these humanizing variables is intellectual capacity.
This reference is not restricted to the lack or presence of a high
intelligence quotient and a conventional legal education. Rather,
it is extended to include the degree to which a judge can exhibit
tolerance, patience and understanding, and control emotions,
prejudice and desires.
In discussing the intellectual capacity of judges as decision-
makers, it is necessary to consider both trial courts and appellate
courts. To be disturbingly practical, it must be noted that some
critics and analysts in their ivory towers are becoming aware of
the existence of trial courts and of the fact that they are the very
hub of our judicial system. To be disgustingly candid, it must be
noted that the masses of laws and decisions are vehicles of en-
tanglement for the common man at the trial level. Laws and
decisions are necessary because of conflicts between people and
between people and the state. Most of these conflicts end in
compromise rather than litigation, and most litigated cases are
never appealed. These facts pinpoint the trial court as the
workhorse of any court system. To be sure, the higher one goes
in the echelon of courts the higher the level of policy decisions as
a general rule. This is a fact for the simple reason that the wider
the scope or the deeper the impact of a decision, the more need
that it be thoroughly litigated to get the final and conclusive word
in order to lay the matter to rest. But compromises always in-
volve policy in a considerable degree, because men thereby
relinquish rights to buy their peace. The same is true at the trial
level. Such commonplace matters as continuance, change of
venue, waiver of trial by jury, pre-trial orders and new trial
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
bave nothing to do with the way courts decide cases."-FeILx Cohen, The Problems
of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 Modem L. Rev. 5, 24-25 (1987).
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involve policy decisions in all cases and of considerable magni-
tude in some. Yet the busy trial lawyer uses these tools of the
trade so mechanically that he does not consciously think of policy
in most cases.
County magistrates, justices of the peace, county judges,
police judges and circuit judges make judicial decisions and
make policy in the process. All too frequently, the only evidence
of their claim to competence as judicial officers is their own
decision to run for office. Federal judges secure their offices for
life and frequently as plums of political patronage, despite
protestations to the contrary, and not on the basis of their merits.
The longer they stay in office and the higher they climb in the
federal system of courts the more removed they are from the
people whose destinies their decisions control. In the vernacular,
state law is local law and federal law is foreign law to the average
man. This makes for abstract justice as opposed to personalized
justice in lower state courts. Perhaps this type of justice is an aid
to unpolluted purity of decisions. On the other hand, it has the
potential for decisions to declare personal preferences of judges
rather than those of the people. Such decisions are non-intel-
lectual in that they do not exhibit the exercise of mental discipline
in relation to the problem to be solved, preferably, in consonance
with community objectives. True intellectuality in decisions does
not mean that the judge will individualize all cases without
regard to rules of law. Rather, it means he will recognize that a
particular rule of substantive law may narrowly, obtusely, and
callously foreclose certain factors which should be taken into
consideration in reaching a vise and just decision. In that event,
the judge with perspective and a vision will reach the right
decision if ethically possible without blindly saying "the remedy,
if any, is with the legislature." This is true intellectualism in
decisions, provided the judge has his emotion and prejudices
under reasonable control and is not legislating his own code of
morals or social conduct for the community.
Lack of intellectual capacity as a maker of decisions may be
demonstrated, not by conscious disregard of legal precepts, but
by a lack of knowledge and insufficiency of background in the
law. This defect in judicial thinking and action is not limited to
state courts. This observation is given fall credence by a Federal
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District Judge's comment to the jury on the credibility of the
defendant in a criminal prosecution in these words:66
And now I am going to tell you what I think of the defendant's
testimony. You may have noticed, vlr. Foreman and Gentle-
men, that he wiped his hands during his testimony. It is a
rather curious thing but that is almost always a sure sign of
lying. Why it is so we don't know, but that is a fact. I think
everything that man said, except when he agreed with the
Government's testimony, was a lie. Now that opinion is an
opinion on the evidence and is not binding on you, and if you
don't agree with it, it is your duty to find him not guilty.
This comment is not a mere procedural mistake, something
that occurs on every trial. It is a judicial tirade which demon-
strates a biased attempt to influence the outcome of a trial
through unfair comment and ignorance as to the meaning of
physiological manifestations of a witness. Experienced trial law-
yers often make the mistake of attributing various nervous habits
to the fact that a witness is lying. In another federal case much
was made of the fact that the trial judge had opportunity to
exanine the witness and observe his demeanor, and to judge his
truthfulness and intelligence from his manner of testifying.67 But
psychologists maintain that experiments indicate rather con-
sistently the error in attempting to estimate intelligence or truth-
fulness from physiognomy or appearance. 68
In another federal case, admission or exclusion of certain
evidence erroneously turned on application of the best evidence
rule."0 The trial judge refused to distinguish between direct oral
testimony, based upon personal knowledge, as to partnership
earnings and partnership books showing net earnings. He applied
the best evidence rule on the basis of cases in which the contents
of writings are to be proved and excluded the oral testimony.
In so doing, he refused to listen to an argument for admissibility
saying, "I am not going to hear an elementary argument on law
school evidence." The distinction was not elementary and the
Circuit Court, in reversing, indicated that the trial judge would
have been well-advised to have heard the attorney. Here the
GO Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 468 (1933).
67 Oliver v. United States, 267 Fed. 544 (C.C.A. 4, 1920).
0 Burtt, Legal Psychology, 113 (1931).
G9 Herzog v. Swift & Co., 146 F.2d 444 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
YENTcKY LAw JouNVAL
trial judge demonstrated his impatience, intolerance and lack of
knowledge of the law of evidence in acting so arbitrarily.
As a final example of judicial ineptitude, in a prosecution for
murder a crucial issue was the admissibility of a confession,
alleged by the defendant to have been obtained through coer-
cion. 0 The defendant, on trial, objected to admission of the
confession. The jury was excluded from the court room and the
trial judge heard the prosecution's evidence to the effect that the
confession was voluntary. To rebut this evidence, the prisoner,
through counsel, asked that he be allowed to take the stand, in
the absence of the jury, and give his version of how the confession
was obtained. The trial court simply ruled "as a matter of law"
that it could not hear the defendant's testimony on the prelimi-
nary inquiry looking to the admissibility of the alleged con-
fession. The conviction that followed was reversed on appeal
and exclusion of the defendant's testimony was held prejudicial
error since, if believed, it would have made the confession inad-
missible. The trial court in this case made such a flagrant and
one-sided ruling as to indicate near-stupidity and little regard for
the rights of the defendant.
The examined cases are by no means unique, and in this fact
lies their significance. They serve to portray only a few of many
cases that receive rank judicial mistreatment at the trial level.
And only the appealed cases have an opportunity at correction.
Many go unappealed and the trial judge's lack of intellectual
capacity goes undiscovered beyond those immediately affected
by erroneous rulings. Further, these cases are, so to speak, run
of the mill on the facts. It requires little imagination to realize
how such judges would butcher new and different cases of
significance from the formulation of policy standpoint. The
logical conclusions to be reached from a review of these selected
cases are that a judge is not necessarily competent merely be-
cause he decides to run for judicial office, and appointment of
judges for life terms by political officeholders is not a valid
certification of judicial qualifications. A method of recall other
than impeachment for gross misconduct is sadly needed. Cor-
rection of errors by appeal is a costly, delaying procedure and is
70 State v. Whitener, 191 N.C. 659, 132 S.W. 603 (1926).
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not a guarantee of sound decisions as the reviewing court may be
unreviewable.
c. Political Inclinations
We have seen that judges are either elected or owe their
offices to appointment as a result of political party affiliation. In
either case, the part), members in power at county, district, state
or national level get to name judges of their party to office-judges
who are presumably impartial arbiters and unfettered by obliga-
tions which may affect or even control their decisions. 7' But this
may mean that courts are strictly pro-administration with respect
to decisions which are political in nature such as judicial and
congressional re-districting, election contest cases, land value
re-assessment, state merit systems and tax programs. The same
court may become anti-administration with a shift in political
power and tenure of the judges running beyond that of state
administrative officers. This results in two branches of govern-
ment being at odds, with each trying to hamstring the official
activities of the other.72 A pro-administration court can definitely
foster the political strengthening of an administration which
seeks to build a political machine and perpetuate itself in office
through naming its successors. On the other hand, an intraparty
struggle between the judicial and executive branches in this
arena can just as certainly hamper very seriously the political
ambitions of a particular administration.
Identifying Objectives
Political objectives and policy objectives of governmental
authority are not entirely separable. That is, the executive and
legislative branches may be in accord with respect to the need
for urban renewal, relief to depressed areas, wooing of industry
and expansion of parks and recreational facilities. And these
71 n 1960, the Republican party, with President Eisenhower in office, sought
a deal .vhereby about sxty additional federal district judges would be appointed
under enabling legislation. Thirty of the judges would have been Democrats and
thirty Republican. The Democrats elected to gamble on the outcome of the
election and won. Now they have the opportunity to select only judges of their
part72 This situation is by no means a rarity at the state level. The ubiquitous
"Happy" Chandler of Kentucky feuded constantly with an anti-administration court
during his second term as Governor. He threatens to return, when eligible to run
a gain, and renew his feuds with all and sundry who oppose his political views,
19651
KENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
matters may be part of a political platform designed to secure
election to office, but backed by sound policy thinking, neverthe-
less, in view of real needs of the community. Purely political
motivation has power and self-aggrandizement as its objectives.
Yet these purposes defy complete isolation. Even Hitler and
Mussolini accomplished some incidental good. At the other
extreme, self-effacement in the interest of dedicating one's life to
the service of others carries with it a sense of well-being and
self-satisfaction, even self-righteousness. So the decision-maker
in any of the three branches of government may act for personal
or public motives, but a little of both is present in any event.
A governor elected from a depressed area may feed state
funds into that area to finance rehabilitating projects. Public and
private purposes are present. The more efficiently the program
is administered and the more people it reaches, then the more
public is the purpose. But if the program is shot with graft in an
opportunity to pay off and hold local party stooges in line, the
political objective is dominant.
Legislatures are subject to the same pressures and conflicting
purposes. They may pass ripper bills to strip statutory power
from elected officers who are opposed to the administration in
power. They may redistrict, when required by population shifts,
in a manner to deprive a minority party of its present representa-
tion in a particular county or district. And they may vote pay
raises for themselves as a legislative body. Incidentally, its nice
to note that in this latter situation labor and management are in
complete accord as one. Labor demands a raise in pay, and
management says "you are certainly entitled to it." These ex-
amples show that legislatures are politically and personally
motivated. Fortunately, they recognize obligations, to their own
constituents first and then to the political unit as a whole, which
make most of their acts public in character and properly moti-
vated.
Next, as already briefly noted, judges, due to political affilia-
tion, with their very official existence resting on political toler-
ance, are subject to having their legal thinking politically domi-
nated at times. This starts at the bottom, with traffic judges
"fixing" tickets for political friends, and works its way into higher
courts at the trial level. Some judges may, on motion or other-
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wise, vacate the bench when personal and political inclinations
conflict with judicial duties. Others are adamant in the face of
such conflicts. However, judges may be faced with decisions in
fields that are new and volatile, with public policy lying close to
the surface. In such event, courts can articulate on lawful and
unlawful purposes and objectives of society as the basis for
decision, with political expediency no more than secondary. Per-
haps their decisions wvill formulate policies upon which there is
substantial agreement among the public.
One of the more serious problems faced by courts at higher
levels is that of making antiquated constitutions accommodate
themselves to present day needs of society-as determined by the
courts. The court may breathe life and breath into a constitution
and then, with tongue in cheek, state that the constitution is a
living document devised to change and grow with society. The
drafters would doubtless be either shocked or elated to realize
that they possessed this clairvoyant perspicacity. On the other
hand, other courts, baffled by the ancient chains of 100 year old
constitutions may decide less subtly for effective action despite
the constitution. This method of judicial disregard led one state
supreme court justice to remark, "the constitution is what this
court says it is."73 In these cases personal and political motives
may be, and usually are, sub-currents, but, primarily, motivation
is public-spirited.
Finally, the circle is completed by the people who attempt to
speak their will, public or personal, through election of officers
and votes on constitutional amendments. Imagine a people who
are soundly oriented against a general sales tax. They elect a
governor and at the same election approve a constitutional
amendment for a veterans' bonus to be paid by a sales tax. The
implementing legislation provides a three per cent sales tax.
One per cent goes for payment of the bonus with two per cent
being used for educational and health program expansion. The
73 The Kentucky voters have consistently refused proposals to change con-
stitutional limits on state indebtedness and salaries to state employees and officers.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has in turn been forced to turn its back on
violations of the state constitution in order that the state not stand still or go
bacl,mvard in the fields of health and education. The most recent decision in point
is Board of Education of Graves County v. DeWeese, 343 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1961).
The remark as to the court's treatment of the constitution was made to the writer
by the late Judge James J. Cammack, Jr.
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run-away legislature had power to enact the sales tax and
required the constitutional amendment for the bonus. The
"people" got a package deal for which they did not bargain, and
feel double-crossed by the executive and legislative branches of
government.7 4 The result is explosive because the people had a
private not public purpose in speaking through an organized
veterans' organization to swing the vote. This problem is always
present. Voters tend to defeat school tax measures to build
needed schools and hire new teachers. This tendency remains
paramount until the situation becomes so critical that public
need overrides private interests. Then the hue and cry about
public waste and political patronage subsides in favor of positive
action.
Control of Social and Economic Thinking
Political alignment may be inherited or by choice, but it
always influences or determines social and economic philosophies
and legal thinking. People with a voice in government seek legal
sanctions calculated to foster the most idealistic form of a free
society. What form of government will best put into action
desirable political, economic and social theories they inquire?
Hamilton had as his ideal a government by the rich, the well-born,
and the able. Schurz saw government by civil service as an ideal.
And Frankfurter entertained the gospel of government by experts.
We, in this country, possess the potential for realizing some or all
of these ideals in varying degrees at different times in history
by reason of social unrest, political upheaval, economic crisis,
and international turbulence through elaborate checks and bal-
ances in our tripartite form of government. 75 Back of it all is the
binary system of political parties exercising control over the
three branches of government.
Office seekers and decision-makers in all fields are political
party representatives, and, as noted, social and economic philoso-
phies in government are controlled by political and legal thinking
74 The described events took place in Kentucky a few years ago and the re er-
cussions may be so loud and strong as to influence the next legislature to re uce
the sales tax. Tis will necessarily curtail ambitious health, welfare and schoolprograms.pr Critics have seen our Constitution as a "conspiracy against government",
and our government so complex and inefficient as to make it impossible for a greatpresident, a competent governor, or able mayor to effectuate reforms of any sig-
nifcance and merit.-F. S. Cohen, Ethics, Vol. LV, No. 3, 167-170 (1945).
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to a considerable extent. A legislative body tends to support the
executive for this reason, particularly when there has been a
general political turnover due to a shift in public sentiment.
Court members due to tenure of office may be out of harmony
with current trends in governmental activity as expressed by the
other two branches of government. This in turn can lead to an
impasse with a reactionary court, which does not represent new
philosophies, blocking needed governmental programs. The re-
sult is a battle for power. If the executive, backed by the legisla-
ture, proves stronger, with the will to act, "court packing", as in
the early days of the "New Deal", is a means of break through.
A change in court personnel is not the sole means of bringing
about a change in the legal philosophy of court members. Justice
Frankfurter presents a living example. In his younger days he
was considered the radical inspiration of the New Deal philoso-
phy. From this position he gravitated to a sort of swing man,
acting as something of a balance wheel between conservatives
and liberals on the Court. Before his retirement he was found
voting with the conservatives more and more. The reason for
this cannot be fully determined. Perhaps age tends to dull the
crusading fever of youth. But, certainly, a personality clash with
Chief Justice Warren was a factor in influencing Frankfurter's
judicial attitude. In a recent five to four decision the majority
reversed the murder conviction of a District of Columbia man
because of a question asked of him by the prosecutor when he
voluntarily took the witness stand in his third trial for the same
offense.7, Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the dissenters,
but when it was read in open court he added a vigorous verbal
condemnation of the majority opinion. He suggested that those
subscribing to it were hunting through the record to find "what
the mind is looking for." He also charged that the majority
opinion was an "indefensible" example of recent excessively
finicky appellate review of criminal cases. Justice Warren an-
swered with a rebuke which was mild under the circumstances,
but a rebuke nevertheless.
The open, personal conflict within the court has its roots in a
division of the court much more important than the occasion of
the dispute itself. This dispute centers around the issue of
70 Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
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whether the government exists for the protection of the individual
or whether individual rights must from time to time be sacrificed
for the protection of the government. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan are generally united in the
opinion that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the indi-
vidual are being invaded by Congress, by state inquisitorial
committees and occasionally by the courts. For a time Justice
Frankfurter rather consistently agreed with this view, but was,
nevertheless, a steadying balance wheel. Later, he was more
definitely identified with Justices Clark, Whittaker and Stewart.
These three seldom-varying conservatives recognize that indi-
vidual rights must be subordinated to needs of government on
critical issues, particularly national security. This leaves Justice
Harlan, who has become the swing man of the court, agreeing
sometimes with one side and at times with the other.
This is a very sensitive area of national policy and it is indeed
unfortunate that personalities should affect political and legal
thinking in this manner. Five to four decisions are often neither
satisfactory nor consistent, yet they are the firmest of all, absent
a change in court personnel or a shift such as Justice Frankfurter
experienced.77 So these decisions will be with us until there is a
basic change in the membership of the court or in the philosophy
of the one or two members, who now swing from one side to the
other in the borderline cases. Such change, if it comes, may well
give a decided balance for or against the priority of individual
rights so stoutly, eloquently and consistently advocated by Justice
Warren, Douglas and Black.78
We have seen that political party affiliation tends to color the
77 The unanimous decision or decision with one or two dissenters is much
easier to reverse upon petition for rehearing than is the five to four decision. The
former may be hastily reached with some significant point having been overlooked.
In the five to four decision, the battle lines have been drawn up on opposing
philosophies and thorough argument and discussion have caused positions to
ecome solidified beyond chance of change.78 As of this writing, the majority of the Supreme Court retains its "liberal"
approach in policy decisions. Justice Goldberg, as a member of a minority group
and a former labor union attorney, can be expected to be a liberal in his legalistic
thinking. Justice White is a moderate liberal, but may well become more con-
servative as time passes. It is not unlikely that the 1964 presidential election will
have an impact on the Supreme Court, as well as upon the judicial branch of the
government generally. Viewing the election as a monumental victory for the




policy attitudes of those empowered to make decisions, and that
personality clashes, affecting decisions, are a closely associated
ingredient of the whole. Fortunately, not all basic policy meas-
ures can be identified clearly by a particular political party label.
This is true because so-called liberalism and conservatism, foun-
tainheads of policy, are not only many-faceted concepts but also
tend to cut across party lines as an expediency for preserving the
two-party political system. In turn, this tendency is radiated to
and gives strength and integrity to our politically established
institutions. Were it otherwise, political inclinations of policy
makers would control absolutely the making of decisions and
stultify reason in the law and the democratic process, even now
facing its sternest test in history, could offer little to justify its
existence.79
d. Environmental Background; Personality Structure
It is not our purpose at this point to attempt a settlement of
an age-old controversy. We will simply observe that personality
is a product of environment in a considerable degree. It is true,
without any reasonable doubt, that environmental background
and personality structure color a man's decisions be it on the
bench, in business, or in a barroom. Just as it is trite but true
that one usually inherits his religion and political affliation, so do
environment and personality influence one's thinking on things
legal. This is to say that selecting or making principles of law
for the settlement of controversies is inescapably subjective in
varying degrees.
7) Legislatures and courts tend to consist of "hard cores" of opposing philoso-
phies. If the dominating political philosophy in a legislative body is in harmony
with the executive branch of government, then much of the executive's policy as
expressed by political platform will become law. But there are usually "swingmen"
who act as balance wheels to curb the executive on "all-out" social and economic
legislation. The result is compromise in particular areas. However, in times of
national crisis such as great national economic depression, or threat to national
security, opposing political philosophies will be subordinated to the public interest
in a politically organized group which is sensitive to the welfare of the whole
community.
Courts tend to be less politically oriented than legislators. Judges may be
politically appointed or elected but, at least ostensibly, assume the role of
impartial arbiters. This is particularly true of courts which are called upon in a
majority of cases to interret and apply a rule of law based upon statute orjudicial precedent. But with supreme courts of states having intermediate appellate
levels and the United States Supreme Court, where many of the decisions require
determination of policy measures, sharper divisions of legal thinking result. Here
personality determinants rather than rules of law influence the maldng of decisions,
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One's sympathy is aroused by causes he has espoused and
one's thinking is influenced by his background in the law as well
as in other fields of experience. For example, a prospective juror
in a personal injury action against a railway company stated on
voir dire examination that he had been a purchasing agent for a
railroad company in the past and was biased in favor of the
defendant in such an action."' In a similar situation, involving an
action against an electric power company, a prospective juror
stated that he was the president of two corporations and was
prejudiced against personal injury actions against corporations."1
The same has to be true about judges who after all are only
men. Federal judges in the south have been slow to enforce
integration of the races simply because it is contrary to their
culture and concepts of states' rights under the constitution. Such
a judge sees the public accommodations law as infringing on
private property rights, while his counterpart in the north views
discrimination in public accommodations as a denial of due
process. Such judicial prejudices are innate, and have a stronger
opportunity to flourish where the problem involves one of policy
rather than the rule of law.
A recent case in a federal district court of Vermont very
clearly emphasizes how a judge's environmental background can
shape his thinking. This was a personal injury action in which the
trial judge charged the jury, in part, as follows:
1. This is the only opportunity for the plaintiff to have a jury
decide her damages.
2. The jury should award the plaintiff such damages "as they
would wish a jury to award them if they were in the posi-
tion of the plaintiff."
Met by the defense attorney's objection to this "golden rule"
instruction, the trial judge inquired: "You are another fellow
that doesn't believe in the teachings of the Good Lord that prevail
in Vermont. Is that correct?" The verdict for the plaintiff was
reversed on appeal as a result of the erroneous instruction and
prejudicial remark. 2
80 Fitts v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 149 Cal. 310, 86 P. 710 (1906).
81 Vessels v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 219 S.W. 80 (Mo. 1920).
82 Callaghan v. Lague Express Co., 298 F.2d 349 (C.C.A. 2d 1962).
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The Supreme Court and the New Deal
In the preceding subsection there was some discussion of the
effect of political inclinations in shaping judicial decisions on
matters of law and policy. Naturally, one's environmental back-
ground has much to do with political inclinations. The same is
true with respect to personality structure. Personal differences on
multi-judge courts can arouse such friction as to lead to emotional
outbursts and a change in views on law and policy. We have
mentioned Justice Frankfurter change in legal philosophy, but
briefly. A bit more detailed comment on the "New Deal" court
should be profitable.
It is entirely in keeping with the best traditions of New
Dealers that the last two Roosevelt appointees to the Supreme
Court should wind up with angry words after twenty-four years
of close philosophical association. For nearly a quarter of a
century, no two justices have voted as one quite as often as Hugo
L. Black and William 0. Douglas. So when Douglas hurled snarls
and sneers at his "brother", thirteen years his senior in age, it was
both astonishing and yet quite wholly in line with the relations
among the six men Franklin D. Roosevelt sent to the court over a
four-year period.
With the exception of Kentucky's Stanley M. Reed, the Roose-
velt appointees engaged in battles among themselves so openly
that they became common public knowledge. In the midst of
nearly all those storms was the amiable, puckish, gentle but
tenacious Black, who, although seventy-eight years old, appears
likely to be the last of the New Dealers to sit on the court, just as
he was the first of the six.
What made the June 7, 1963, attack by Douglas upon Black
so notable was the fact that it was made in the very terms that
so often have been used against Douglas. The sin Douglas at-
tributed to Black was that of creating "judge-made" law by
ignoring the intent of Congress in order to write his own views
into law. Ironically, this precisely is what conservative groups
and members of the radical right have been charging against the
entire "Warren Court" for nearly a decade. And no two justices
have created more judge-made law in the history of the court
than have Douglas and Black, working together. Furthermore,
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these two are the special targets of the group which has been
engaged in pushing through State legislatures a three-piece
package of constitutional amendments designed to curb sharply
the law writing scope of the court.
A member of the John Birch Society could hardly have been
more scathing toward Black than Douglas was on Monday, June
7, when he said in a dissent to Black's majority opinion: "Much is
written these days about judicial law-making; and every scholar
knows that judges who construe the law must of necessity
legislate .... The present case is different. It will, I think, be
marked as the baldest attempt by judges in modem times to spin
their own philosophy into the fabric of the law, in derogation of
the will of the legislature." This, of course, is what the critics
of the court have been saying with increasing intensity since the
school integration decision of 1954. Nor could any conservative
critic of the court denounce it more vigorously for an alleged
extension of the power of the Federal Government than did New
Dealer Douglas.
Douglas stated further and most strongly in his dissent: "The
present decision grants the federal bureaucracy a power and
command over water rights in the seventeen western states that
it never has had, that it always wanted, that it could never per-
suade Congress to grant, and that this court up to now has
consistently refused to recognize."
The case in controversy was the forty-year old litigation be-
tween Arizona on one side and California on the other over use
of water from the Colorado River. In his fifty-two page opinion,
Black, speaking for a five-member majority, gave what is appar-
ently final victory to Arizona. 3 Joining Douglas on one phase of
the case were Justices John Harlan and Potter Stewart. But on
another phase, Douglas was the lone dissenter. Chief Justice
Earl Warren, former governor of California did not participate in
the decision.
This blast by Douglas at his fellow New Dealer was thought
by many at the time to be his swan song. Douglas was sixty-five
years of age in October of 1963, at which time he could have
retired on full pay. But the retirement of Douglas with him
83 Arizona v. California, 878 U.S. 546 (1963).
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taking a prestige job with a big financial foundation did not
materialize. There is Washington gossip to the effect that fellow
Justices would look with favor on his retirement as they have
not looked kindly upon his two divorces and two marriages while
on the court."4
Justice Douglas in uttering words that the conservatives like
to hear is following in the path of two other New Dealers who
sat on the Supreme Court. Justice Black entertained a deep
animosity toward Justice Robert H. Jackson which was prompted
by the fact that he felt Jackson, who owed all his advancement
to the New Deal, had betrayed that social and political revolution
when he failed to uphold it as a Justice. So bitter was Black
against Jackson that when the late Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone died, Black persuaded President Truman not to make
Jackson the Chief Justice, as had virtually been promised by
Roosevelt. To settle the quarrel among Jackson and other New
Dealers, Truman appointed a Kentuckian, Fred M. Vinson, to
Stone's place.
As we have previously noted, Justice Frankfurter was another
New Dealer who turned to the right. So bitter was the philo-
sophical quarrel between Frankfurter and Black that the two
freely exchanged insults from the bench before the former retired
in 1962. And included in the feuding among the New Deal
appointees was the contempt that Jackson not infrequently
expressed for the late Frank Murphy.
Douglas's worry about judge-made law and the extension of
federal power may annoy or amuse those all-out liberals who for
so long a period looked upon him as their champion. Before
Roosevelt appointed him to the court at the age of forty-one,
Douglas had served the New Deal as chairman of the newly
created Securities Exchange Commission. For nine years after
he went on the court in 1939, there was scarcely a time that
Douglas was not being boomed for whatever important job the
government had available. Roosevelt wanted him as his running
mate in 1944 when the big city party bosses convinced him that
Henry A. Wallace was an impediment to the fourth term cam-
paign. In his letter to the Chicago convention Roosevelt said he
84 Robert L. Riggs, Sic Transit New Deal: Douglas Blasts Black To Complete
A Pattern-Louisville Courier Journal, June 9, 1963.
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would accept either Douglas or Truman. The party leaders, of
course, preferred Truman.
Four years later, when the Democratic presidential and vice-
presidential nominations apparently were not worthy accepting,
Truman tried to get Douglas to be his running mate, in an effort
to keep the unhappy liberal bloc of the party in line. But Douglas
was not attracted by the offer, so Truman turned to Kentucky's
Alben W. Barkley. Since 1948, Douglas has figured in no more
political speculation, though he is often in the public eye as an
advocate of the rugged outdoor life who preached physical fitness
long before the New Frontier came to Washington. His mar-
riages also keep him newsworthy.
Prediction of Decisions
In the field of policy-making decisions it may be said that an
informed observer may predict a decision but not decisions.
That is, if a court, as the Supreme Court, has embarked upon a
certain course with a fixed objective-such as the civil rights
cases-its decisions in that area are predictable. Otherwise, the
Supreme Court cannot be safely predicted because it is a splinter
group, influenced by bickering backbiting and personality clashes.
This was patently evident in the New Deal Court, but a bit less
evident in the Warren Court. But the split vote-the five to four
decision-remains prominent, perhaps due more to environmental
factors than personality clashes. Different men think differently
on new and many-faceted political, economic and social issues.
One author suggests another and overlapping reason; it is the
accept, or fight or compromise reaction of each separate liberal
Justice, especially the New Dealers, to the views of his fellow
liberal Justices when their ideas of legal liberalism differed from
his. In short, there were and are personality clashes in the
Supreme Court due to environmental background and personal
differences arising therefrom. This means that the Supreme
Court, or any appellate court, can and does have economic
liberals and civil liberties conservatives, and vice versa.
Justice Black was one of eight children, born in a crossroads
cabin in the small-farm cotton country of Alabama, with little
formal education. His was a natural background for an ultra-
liberal thinker. Justice Frankfurter was born in middle-class
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comfort and well educated. Unfortunately his brilliance was in
some degree lost to the Court through inability to cast aside his
Harvard Law Professor background. He remained notoriously a
professor, lecturing and heckling both attorneys and court col-
leagues alike. From the date of his appointment, the rugged
outdoors-type Douglas voted consistently with Black, the other
ex-poor boy on the Court until their recent breach. No Justice
on the Court was more consistent and passionate in his defense
of civil liberties than was Frank Murphy. Despite his federal law
enforcement background, he was strong in protecting the consti-
tutional rights of those accused of crime. Despite his ardent
Catholic faith he voted to sustain the beliefs of the sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses. Murphy once wrote, "The law knows no
finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts . . . to
protect unpopular citizens against discrimination and persecution."
As for Robert Jackson, he was, as previously noted, a New Dealer
who turned conservative. As Professor Rodell has written, Jack-
son was a man of property who very soon started to talk and
write like a man of property s5
These thumbnail sketches point up the men who were the
original architects of modem liberalism in legalistic thinking. We
might add that Justice Rutledge joined the hard core of liberals
and never shifted. They turned out a lot of law; a lot of it new.
The Warren Court carries on in the same tradition, though less
brilliantly.
e. Personal Prestige
Personal prestige is a two-edged weapon in the decision-
making process. Prestige is a motivating factor in the lives of all
men with any degree of ambition and desire to achieve status
and respect. This position of personal advantage comes first
from the acknowledgement of associates through demonstrated
proficiency on the part of a colleague in his field of human
endeavor. It may spread from there to the immediate com-
munity and on to the state, the nation, and even may become
international in scope-all depending upon the source of prestige,
8 Rodell, Nine Men, 258 (1955). Professor Rodell has written penetrat-
ingly and thoroughly on the background and philosophies of members of the
Supreme Court over a number of years.
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its nature and the number of people who may become the subject
of its influence.
Personal prestige imparts a feeling of well-being to the
possessor, and it may be expected to be beneficial to those who
are affected by the activity or product, intellectual or physical,
which gave rise to certain prestige. For example, Washington,
Babe Ruth and Billy Graham achieved personal prestige: In
turn, colonials were freed and a new nation was born; sports fans
basked in reflected glory; and many souls were saved-temporarily
at least. The desire for personal prestige is a dominating force
in many men, Freud to the contrary notwithstanding." We
noted above that prestige-seeking was an objective of all men
who desired worldly status and respect. There are those men,
of course, who are motivated by intellectual curiosity with
prestige only an incidental or by-product of their efforts.
These curious intellectuals are dedicated men, and we know
from experience that it pays to be curious. It was because an
obscure Austrian monk by the name of Mendel became curious
about the laws that govern heredity that the famous Mendelian
laws were discovered. Sixty years ago, a physicist named Ro-
entgen became interested in the laws which governed the flow of
electricity through a vacuum. As a result, X-rays were discovered.
Scientific curiosity as to why the sun had not cooled to a dark red
ball in its many hundred million years of known existence led to
the discovery that under proper conditions of temperature and
pressure two hydrogen atoms fuse into one helium atom, thereby
releasing tremendous amounts of energy. Today, man can dupli-
cate the solar process of the thermonuclear fusion on Earth.
Yes, it pays to be curious. And this axiom is true in all situations
where productive thought can lead to the betterment of man-
kind's existence in his many and complex relationships.
It will be argued by those who worship rules of law and the
status quo that the law cannot rationally experiment with men
86 It must be recognized that drives in men are like the tides. They ebb and
flow in relation to intellect, experience, age, environment and opportunity. Further-
more, the desire for prestige is consciously willed, while in the world of Sigmund
Freud sex is an instinctive drive-so even philosophers occasionally have children.
The desire for prestige results from conscious intellect. Underlying this is the
unconscious will, which is a striving, persistent, vital force; and which may even
control the intellect where instinctive action is involved. But not always. For
instance, it is said that Diogenes achieved death by refusing to breathe. What a
victory for the intellect over the will to livel
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and their social, material and spiritual rights, except in time of
extreme emergency, or to avoid manifest injustice, as do men of
science experiment with things in satisfying intellectual curiosity
and the desire for prestige. But, nevertheless, there is a type of
trial and error present in the law which is grounded upon
curiosity-curiosity as to how the people affected will react as a
determinant of whether the experiment was right and just.
National prohibition was a "grand experiment" which failed
because unacceptable to the people. "Integration" decisions play
havoc with social relations and tradition. The first decision was
a trial balloon with more to follow.87 They can never become
fully operative unless accepted, reluctantly or otherwise, by those
who bear the brunt of the decisions. As a final example of a
venturesome decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
recently upheld the validity of Sunday "blue laws" in various
states.88 The decision rather obviously reacts adversely on the
freedom of certain religions. Time will tell if this experimental
probing by the Court will continue to withstand the test of
constitutionality.
These few examples could be multiplied ad infinitum. They
demonstrate that, when legislation and judicial decisions strike
at human habits and social custom, curiosity and experimentation
are involved in the changes or invocations sought to be wrought
by law. And the change, or invocation, is desirable and operative
if accepted by those subject to the sanction invoked. The process
is by no means alien to the law of evidence. Rather, rules of
evidence are an evolvement of the process, where fine distinctions
are the rule rather than the exception. For instance, as we have
noted, use of a stomach pump to secure incriminating evidence
"shocks the conscience" under concepts of due process,89 while
using a hypodermic needle to extract blood from an unconscious
person does not;'0 securing evidence by means of a detecta-
phone placed against a wall to overhear conversations in an
adjoining office does not violate Fourth Amendment rights of the
suspect,91 while, accomplishing the same purpose by means of a
87 Browm v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
ss Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
SO Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
00 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
91 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1941).
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"spike mike", driven into the crevice of a wall until it made
contact with a heating duct, which thereby acted as a sounding
board within the suspect premises was a trespass by "physical
penetration" which invalidated the evidence so secured;92 and a
"second confession" may or may not be the product of the first,0 3
while the voluntariness of a confession is tested by the inquiry
as to whether it was in fact the product of coercion, physical or
psychological, and not by evidence that it was reliable thus
negativing coercion.9" Such fine distinctions in the law are often
necessary. On the other hand they may merely evince personal
predilections of decision-makers for particular methods of secur-
ing evidence. If, however, the decisions prove to be sound
pronouncements of intellectual analysis and curiosity they are
accepted as such, and personal prestige or stature in the legal
arena is enhanced.
In concluding our commentary on personal prestige of decision-
makers, it is necessary to note that such prestige may be derived
from such factors as political power, social status, personality,
intelligence, experience and integrity. Hence, personal prestige
can be viewed as cutting across all characteristics which affect
the decision-making process; and the degree of prestige possessed
by particular decision-makers determines to what extent they can
influence the decisions of others.
f. Social Security
Economic or social security as a factor in the decision making
process must, of necessity, be discussed in a manner which is
largely abstract. However, economic well-being of decision-
makers, or lack thereof, has two significant facets. First, there is
the possibility that judges may accept bribes to control their
decisions. Isolated cases of judicial bribery are revealed from
time to time, but, largely, our judiciary is corruption free. Under-
paid judges of ability are more likely to seek other fields of
endeavor than to succumb to bribery.
This observation leads us to the second consideration raised
by economic security. Judges cannot live on prestige alone, but,
if our judicial offices are well-paid, then more competent judges
92 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
93 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).94 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
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can be obtained. The writer once heard a Federal Court of
Appeals judge complain that he was paid less than the magistrates
in New York City, and could not make it financially except for
writing and teaching on the side. This came from one of this
country's most prominent federal judges. Fortunately, his honor
and integrity was above the slightest suspicion. Furthermore,
this statement was made to the writer a number of years ago, and
the economic situation of our federal judges has been rather well
taken care of by substantial raises in salaries since then. There is
a great need for such adjustments in many state courts at both
trial and appellate levels. Badly needed salary raises would
attract men of greater competency to judgeships, with re-
sultant improvement in the quality of decisions.
Conclusion
Let us consider our culture. Ours is the age of the big city and
the machine, space travel and scientific investigation. New
nations are emerging and minority groups clamor for recognition.
There is no turning back or even standing still in these dynamic
times. And it is incumbent upon the judicial structure to meet the
challenge it is presented by the demands and expectations of a
rapidly developing society. In this changing world courts cannot
remain static. The population explosion coupled with urbaniza-
tion are producing economic, social, and industrial problems
which must be approached intelligently. The Supreme Court of
the United States is meeting the monumental challenge of high
policy decisions. The state courts must do likewise or wallow in
the morass of judicial chaos. We have identified and discussed
certain factors that influence the decision-making process. We
have discussed certain cases which demonstrate wise policy in
decision-making. We have seen others that show how arbitrary
and reactionary courts can be. But we can be reasonably assured
that our judges will be as modem as the times in which they live,
if we select, by appointment or the electorate, competent, con-
scientious men who are paid to perform the duties expected of
them. It is as simple as that.
